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Abstract 
Recovery ‘of a theory T is needed if it does not have a model under the given semantics Sem, i.e., 
if the theory is Sem-inconsistent. In general, to recover an inconsistent theory T, a transformation 
R is applied to T and T is replaced by a consistent theory R(T). If a classical semantics is used, it 
is clear that R should be a contraction. For nonmonotonic theories, e.g., nonmonotonic databases, 
however, in general it is unclear how to restore the consistency of such a theory: indeed, several 
options for recovery that use (mixtures of) contractions and expansions have been proposed in the 
literature. In this paper, we propose a more fundamental approach to study the recovery problem by 
stating some minimal set of rationality postulates for recovery. In these postulates we assume that, 
when recovering a theory T with respect to some intended semantics, one can fall back on a weaker, 
so called backup semantics for T. Based on these rationality postulates our general conclusion is that 
for cumulative theories, expansions are not suitable, while for noncumulative theories like default 
logic, auto-epistemic logic and nomnonotonic logic programming, contractions cannot be used as 
recovery operators. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Theory revision; Nonmonotonic logic 
1. Introduction 
Theory recovery is the process of changing an inconsistent theory T in such a way 
that it becomes consistent. Here, a theory is just an arbitrary, not necessarily closed, set of 
sentences. The dominant approach to recovery of classical theories is the well-known AGM 
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[4] framework for theory revision where the recovery of an inconsistent theory T consists 
in replacing T by a contraction T’ of T, i.e., Tf is a consistent theory obtained from T 
by removing some part of T. Regardless of the choice for the exact part of the theory 
to be removed, there is no discussion about the t-vpe of recovery operator to be applied 
here: whenever a classical theory is inconsistent, contraction is a natural type of recovery 
operator to use in restoring consistency. This connection, however, is not so obvious if 
we have to restore consistency in nonclassical theories such as nonmonotonic theories. 
Here, it is not clear at all which type of recovery operator would be most suitable, since 
besides a consistent subtheory T’ of T there also may exist a consistent theory T” strictly 
containing T. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in the literature different proposals for recovery 
of nonmonotonic theories have been offered. In [12], contractions are proposed in 
recovering nonmonotonic theories. In [8], the authors propose to recover a theory by 
means of a (minimal) set of both additions and removals, while others like [ 1,14,16,18] 
use expansions to restore consistency in (nonmonotonically) inconsistent theories. Many 
of these approaches, however, seem to work well for only a particular formalism and for 
some ad hoc reasons. Clearly, what the field lacks is a formulation of the ideas underlying 
the recovery process in a clear and unifying way. 
It is therefore the purpose of this paper to state a set of intuitive and general rationality 
postulates every recovery process has to satisfy at the least. Essentially, these postulates 
aim to describe which properties a suitable recovery operator should minimally have, 
independently from the specific properties of the intended logic used. We remark, however, 
that it is not our intention to fully characterize this recovery process. These rationality 
postulates are primarily used to establish a relation between the type of recovery operator 
used (i.e., a contraction, an expansion or perhaps a mix of them) and the particular abstract 
properties of the (intended) logic used, such as monotonicity, cumulativity, etc. 
We motivate and introduce these postulates for recovery in Section 2, after we have 
identified some crucial properties of consequence operators associated with the range of 
logics we want to investigate. Then, in Section 3, using these properties, we state some 
results pertaining to the type of the recovery operation that should be applied in order 
to satisfy the rationality postulates. Our general conclusion is that there is a rather sharp 
division between logics satisfying (weak) cumulativity and those that do not. This means 
that, contrary to what one might expect on the basis of recovery of classical theories, theory 
contraction is not suitable for recovery of nonmonotonic theories as default logic, auto- 
epistemic logic and nonmonotonic logic programming. On the other hand, expansion is 
not suitable whenever we are dealing with (weakly) cumulative logics, like classical logic, 
preferential logics and circumscription. 
In Section 4, we show how the framework can be applied successfully in the recovery of 
logic programs using the stable model semantics. 
Finally, in Section 5 we present some main conclusions and suggest some ways to 
generalize the recovery framework presented. 
Remark. The attentive reader may have noticed that we use the expression “theory 
recovery” instead of the perhaps more common expression “theory revision”. The reason 
is that in theory revision there is a conflict between some theory T and a piece of new 
C. Witteveen, ?V van der Hoek/Artijicial Intelligence 106 (1998) 139-159 141 
information 45 that is accepted anyway. Revision then comes down to recovery of the theory 
T’ = T U {c$} with the additional constraint that 4 should be implied by the recovered 
theory. Therefore, recovery is more general than revision: we do not make any assumption 
with respect to the cause of the inconsistency and with respect to the information that has 
to be retained or not. 
2. A framework for theory recovery 
We want to deal with theory recovery using a range of logics varying from classical 
to non-monotonic logics. In all cases, using a logic with semantics Sem to reason about 
a theory T boils down to selecting a subset of intended models (Sem-models) from 
some background collection of models for T. In the classical case it is tempting to 
identify the class of intended models with the class of background models, 3 while in the 
nonmonotonic case the set of intended models usually is a strict subset of the class of all 
(background) models of T. We say that T is Sem-inconsistent and needs to be recovered 
if the set of intended models of T determined by Sem is empty. We might say that the 
intended models of a theory T under a semantics Sem represent hose states of affairs we 
are willing to consider as acceptable or normal, while the remaining set of background 
models characterizes more or less abnormal states of affairs. These intended models are 
useful for making predictions about the world if it is as normal as we suppose it is. For 
example, the idea about nonmonotonic theories is that they allow one to use common 
sense reasoning patterns to infer facts that normally can be expected, given a state of 
affairs represented by the theory. In this view an inconsistent theory T, characterized by the 
absence of intended models, signals an abnormal state of affairs that we want to resolve. 
Confronted with such a difficulty, in principle we could choose between two possible ways 
to overcome them: 
(1) Change the underlying reasoning mechanism. 
The original (intended) semantics is considered as defective and has to be replaced 
by a more sophisticated semantics that is also able to handle such (slight) 
abnormalities. 
(2) Change the theory. 
Instead of considering these properties as defects of a semantics, one could also 
reason that such consequences have to be expected if the world apparently is 
not a:s normal as expected and therefore, instead of changing our semantics, we 
have to change our ideas about what actually is the case. Adapting to such slight 
abnormalities should be sufficient to make our intended reasoning applicable again. 
In this paper we choose the second alternative: we do not blame our semantics for failing 
to provide the right models, since this semantics was intended to be used in normal states 
of affairs. Instead, if we are in such a situation in which the intended set of models for 
T is empty, whereas the set of background models is not, we consider the latter set as an 
approximation of the set of intended models. For, since it allows for more abnormalities 
to occur and is successful (i.e., does yield models), it may give us clues about which 
3 But note that a paraconsistent semantics can also be used as a background semantics. 
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abnormalities we have to be prepared for. This information then, can be used to change 
the original theory T to a recovered theory T’. Since the abnormalities have now been 
accounted for in T’, it seems natural to apply our original intended semantics to T’ to 
derive our standard expectations module the abnormalities we discovered. This explains 
why we adhere to the principle change the theory and not the logic to reason with. 
It is clear that in this recovery scheme two semantics for a theory T play a part: an 
intended semantics Semint providing the collection of intended models of T and a backup 
semantics Semb& providing a collection of background models to choose from. So we 
assume that Semi,,(T) _C Semb,k(T). If, for a given theory T, it turns out that T is Sem- 
inconsistent, i.e., Semi,t(T) = 0, while Semb,k(T) # 0, we want to recover T, replacing it 
by a transformed theory T’ = R(T) such that T’ is Semi,t-consistent. 
Of course, not every transformation of T is acceptable; we will use some notion 
of minimal change to choose between different alternatives. But how to measure the 
difference between T and T’? That is exactly where we have our backup semantics for: 
we choose the recovery operator R in such a way that T and R(T) differ as little as 
possible with respect to the backup semantics. To measure this difference between two 
theories we will use a distance function. Taking this very global idea about recovery as our 
point of departure, we would like to study its consequences for the type of recovery (e.g., 
contraction or expansion) to apply. 
Before we formally introduce the framework and translate these ideas in some rationality 
postulates, we give two examples, showing how this framework might be applied to both 
monotonic and nonmonotonic theory recovery. 
Example 2.1. We show that the standard AGM approach to classical theory revision fits 
well to our approach. Suppose that we have a classical inconsistent theory T and apply for 
example afull meet contraction Rfm to T to change it into a consistent theory T’. In this 
case our intended semantics is classical, while as our backup semantics we might take a 
semantics that given a theory T returns the set of all models of maximal consistent subsets 
of T. Clearly, for every theory T, the set of intended (= classical) models is contained 
in the set of backup models. Also note that in this case T and the full meet contraction 
Rfm(T) are equal under the backup semantics. 
Example 2.2. We now show that using a nonmonotonic intended semantics also expan- 
sions might be used to recover a theory. As an example we take Reiter’s Default Logic 
(DL) and use an entailment relation 4 based on the intersection of all Reiter extensions as 
our intended semantics and an entailment relation based on the intersection of all minimal 
extensions as our backup semantics. More precisely, given a theory W and a fixed set of 
defaults D, the intended meaning of W is based on the intersection of all Reiter extensions 
of the default theory (W, D) and the backup semantics is based on the intersection of all 
minimal extensions of (W, 0). 
Suppose that we have the following set D of defaults: 
If you push the button for the 13th floor (a) and you can assume the system not to be 
faulty (lx), then the cage moves up to the 13th floor (b). So dl = a : -x/b. 
4 We take the liberty to represent a semantics by an entailment relation based on it. 
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If the system is faulty (x) and you can assume to be the first person to notice this (c), 
then you call the mechanic (d): d2 = x : c/d. 
Now it happens that a is the case (W = {a}). Then according to your intended semantics, 
you will expect a and b to hold since there is a unique (Reiter) extension EA = Cn({a, b}) 
for this default theory A = (W, 0). Note that in this case the minimal extensions are 
&({a, b]), Cn((u, x, d}) and &({a, X, -c}). Hence, according to our backup semantics, 
we cannot conclude that b holds since b does not occur in every minimal extension. 
But what happens if W’ = {a, -b}, i.e., you push the button, but the cage doesn’t move 
up to the 13th floor? Wouldn’t you expect both x and d to hold? 
In this case the default theory A’ = (W’, 0) does not have a Reiter extension and is 
called inconsistent. On the other hand, A’ has two minimal extensions &({a, -b, x, d}) 
and &({a, -lb, x, 1~)). Hence, a, -b and x are consequences of the backup semantics 
under the minimal extensions, but the intuitively acceptable conclusion d is not. So the 
backup semantics is able to detect which abnormalities (x) have to hold, but is too weak to 
infer common-sense conclusions given this state of affairs. 
Now comider the recovery R(W’) = W’ U {x) of W’ accounting for the abnormalities 
detected. First of all, the set of minimal extensions of (R( W’), 0) is equal to the set of 
minimal extensions of (W’, D), so with respect to the backup semantics, both theories 
are equivalent. But unlike (W’, D) the theory (R(W’), 0) has a unique Reiter extension 
Cn( {a, -b , x , d}) and enables us to conclude the intuitively expected conclusion d . 
Hence, by changing the theory to adapt to the apparent abnormalities, we are able 
to apply ou:r intended semantics again. This example also answers a possible question 
about using the backup semantics instead of the intended semantics if the latter causes an 
inconsistency: in most cases, we would like to obtain stronger conclusions than is possible 
when keeping the backup semantics. 
Summarizing, the backup semantics only serves to indicate the abnormalities that we 
have to account for. This information is used to translate the original theory T into a theory 
T’ such that T’ has intended models. The backup semantics serves as a first approximation 
for the recovered set of intended models of the theory T and will be used to select the 
intended models from. 
Before we give a more formal account of these intuitive ideas, we first present some 
terminological and notational conventions. Hereafter, we present some properties of 
consequence operators to characterize different logics we want to investigate and then we 
give a set of rationality postulates for theory recovery. After that we are ready to investigate 
the relationships between on the one hand the logical properties of the backup semantics 
and the intended semantics and on the other hand the type of recovery operator to use. 
2.1. Preliminaries 
Given a Language L, a theory T is any, not necessarily closed, subset of L. We use 
A, B, C to denote variables over theories. We assume to have a way to assign to each T 
some (possibly empty) set of models Mod(T) in some specified class. For any class of 
theories 7 a semantics Sem then is a way to associate consequences p to some T E 7, 
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based on Mod(T). Such a semantics is called well-behaved with respect to T, if Sem(T) 
is defined and is not equal to L. 5 We often identify a semantics Sem with a consequence 
operation CSem :2L + 2L, where, in this paper, we stipulate that C’““(T) = L in case 
Sem(T) is not defined. Generalizing the above, we say that a consequence operator C is 
well-behaved with respect to T if C(T) # L. We focus on theories that have more than 
one semantics, i.e., a backup semantics with associated consequence operator Cb& and an 
intended semantics that corresponds to Cinr. Slightly abusing terminology, if 7 is a set 
of theories, we say that a twin semantics (for 7) is a tuple S = (7, Cb&, Cint) with the 
following property of supra-inferentiality: 
For all A E L, Cbc.(A) C C&A). (supra) 
To measure the difference between two theories with respect to a backup semantics, we 
use a distance function dbck : zL x TL + 8t +. This function is minimally specified by (i) 
dbck(A, B) = 0 iff &&(A) = &k(B) and (ii) d&k(A, B) = db&(B, A) for all A, B E L. 
A recovery operator is a computable function R : 7 + 7. Given a twin semantics 
S for 7, a recovery operator R on 7 and a distance function dbck, we call the tuple 
%.? = (7, Cb&, db&, Cint, R) a recovery framework. 
2.2. Properties of consequence operators 
In this paper, we want to state some general results about the properties a suitable 
recovery operator should have. These properties partly depend on some abstract properties 
of the consequence operators C&k and Cint. Therefore we recall (see, e.g., [l 11) some 
general properties along which one can classify consequence operators: 
A s C(A) (incEusion) 
C(A) = C(C(A)) (idempo tency ) 
If A C B then C(A) g C(B) (monotony) 
If A G B 5 C(A) then C(B) g C(A) (cut) 
If A g B EC(A) then C(A) 5 C(B) (cautious monotony) 
A classical inference operation C will also be denoted by Cn. An inference operation 
C is called tarskian6 if it satisfies inclusion, idempotency and monotony, it satisfies 
cumulativity if both cut and cautious monotony hold. Finally, C is called a cumulative 
inference operation, if it satisfies inclusion and cumulativity. 
The following weaker forms of cut and cautious monotony are also useful: 
If A 5 B g C(A) and C(A) #L then C(B) # L (weak cut) 
If A S B g C(A) and C(B) # L then C(A) #L (weak monotony) 
5 Note that under this definition, if Mod(T) = 0, both a credulous and a skeptical Sem determines &m(T) to 
be not well-behaved. 
6 In particular, the classical consequence operator Cn is a tarskian consequence operator. 
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To see that cut implies weak cut, assume that A z B 5 C(A) and C(A) # L. With cut 
we infer that C(B) E C(A) and, since C(A) # L, we immediately have C(B) # L, so 
weak cut holds. The same holds for the relation between cautious monotony and weak 
monotony. ‘We say that C satisfies weak cumulativity if C satisfies both weak cut and weak 
monotony. Furthermore C is called weakly cumulative if it satisfies inclusion and weak 
cumulativit y. 
2.3. The role of the weak principles in nonmonotonic logics 
Our main motivation to introduce the weak variants of cut and cautious monotony is that 
they help us in distinguishing two clusters of nonmonotonic entailment relations (cf. [ 111): 
one cluster of systems satisfying inclusion and weak cut, and a second cluster of systems 
satisfying inclusion and weak cumulativity. The former we will call the minimal model 
cluster and the latter the grounded cluster. ’ 
Furthermore, we make a distinction between a skeptical and a choice mode ’ of using 
a consequence operator. It is well known that nonmonotonic logics as Default Logic 
(DL), Auto-Epistemic Logic (AEL) and nonmonotonic logic programming (NMLP) do not 
satisfy cautious monotony neither in the skeptical, nor in the choice mode. With respect to 
cut, however, a distinction has to be made between these modes: while the skeptical modes 
of nonmon’otonic consequence operations in general do satisfy cut, their choice modes do 
not (see [ 11 I). This means that this principle fails to distinguish these logics uniformly, i.e., 
independently from the mode in which they are used. 
As we will show now, our weak principles are capable to identify these clusters in 
a uniform way. We show, using default logic as an example, that irrespective of the 
mode (skeptical or choice) in which the nonmonotonic inference operator is used, the 
entailment operators associated with logics in the grounded cluster all satisfy weak cut, 
but fail to satisfy weak monotony. By the correspondences between default logic and 
other nonmonotonic logics, this result also holds for auto-epistemic logic and the stable 
model semantics of logic programming. Conversely, all logics in the minimal model cluster 
trivially satisfy weak cumulativity, since it is implied by cumulativity. 
Proposition 2.3. Let D be an arbitrary set of default rules and let CD denote the inference 
operator using D based on Reiter’s default logic DL. Then CD does not satisfy weak 
monotony but does satisfy weak cut, irrespective from the mode (skeptical or choice) in 
which it is used. 
Proof. We first show that in none of the inference modes weak monotony is sat- 
isfied. It suffices to present one counterexample. Consider the default theory A’ = 
(Ia, lb}, D) from Example 2.2. This theory does not have a Reiter extension and therefore 
Cn({a, -b]) = L both in the skeptical and in the choice mode. Now we have {a, -b} 2 
’ Makinson also denotes them as the strong cluster and the weak cluster, respectively. Only to avoid possible 
confusion here, we name them differently. 
8 In the choice mode, an arbitrary single extension of the theory is chosen. We do not consider the credulous 
mode for consequence operators since it behaves rather irregularly. For example, Ci,t(A) may contain both $J and 
-9 without also having @ A -6. 
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{a, -b, x} C L, but weak monotony fails, since Co({a, -b, x}) = Cn({a, -b, x, d}) # L, 
again both in the skeptical and in the choice mode. 
Next, we show that DL does satisfy weak cut in both modes. Since it satisfies cut in the 
skeptical mode it also satisfies weak cut in the skeptical mode. Therefore, we only have to 
show that it satisfies weak cut in the choice mode. From [ 131, we know that DL satisfies the 
confirmation of evidence principle, stating that for every default theory A = (W, D), the 
theory A’ = (W U W’, 0) has at least one extension E, whenever (W, D) has a consistent 
extension E and W’ E E. Now let A, B be sets of sentences such that A S B C CD (A) 
and suppose that CD(A) # L. Hence, there is some consistent extension EA of the default 
theory (A, D) such that CD(A) = EA. Since B 5 EA, we have B - A c EA, and hence, by 
the confirmation of evidence principle, there is at least one consistent extension Eg for the 
theory (A U (B - A), D) = (B, 0). Select such an extension Eg. Since EB is consistent, 
CD(B) # L and weak cut is satisfied. 
Hence, DL also satisfies weak cut in both the choice mode and the skeptical mode of 
inference. 0 
With respect to AEL and NMLP, by the correspondence results as stated, e.g., in [13], 
we can easily show the same results to hold. We conclude that irrespective of the mode 
in which consequence operators based on mainstream nonmonotonic semantics are used, 
the systems falling in the minimal model cluster all satisfy weak cumulativity, while the 
systems in the grounded model cluster all satisfy weak cut, but not weak monotony. 
2.4. SomeJirst results about recovery frameworks 
Using the abstract principles mentioned before we can derive some properties that will 
turn out to be useful when dealing with recovery. 
Observation 2.4. Let ‘l?! = (7, Cb&, db,-k, Ci,,t, R) be an arbitrary recovery framework, 
where Cb& satisjes inclusion and Gin, satisfies weak cut. Then for every T E I, 
Cint(R(T)) # L implies Cinr(Cbck(R(T))) # L. 
Proof. Let T E 1. Since the underlying twin semantics s = (7, Cb&, Cint) satisfies supra 
and Cb& satisfies inclusion, we have R(T) g Cb,-k(R(T)) c Cini(R(T)). By weak cut, we 
have that Ci,,(R(T)) # L implies Cint(Cbck(R(T))) # L. 0 
Observation 2.5. Let R = (7, Cb&, dbck, Cint, R) be an arbitrary recovery framework, 
where Cb& satisjies inclusion and Cinr satisjies weak monotony. Then for every T E 7, 
Cint(Cbck(R(T))) # L implies Cirzl(R(T)) # L. 
Proof. Let T E 7. Since the underlying twin semantics S = (7, Cb&, Cint) satisfies 
supra and Cb& satisfies inclusion, we have R(T) C Cbck(R(T)) c Ci,r(R(T)). By weak 
monotony it follows that Cint(Cbck(R(T))) #L implies that Cm,(R(T)) # L. 0 
Combining these observations, we have the following useful corollary: 
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COrOkil’y 2.6. tit R = (7, C&k, db&, Cirzt, R) be an arbitrary recovery framework, 
where Cb& satisfies inclusion and Cint satisjies weak cumulativity. Then for every T E T, 
Cint(Cbck(R(T))) # L ifsCint(R(T)> # L. 
The conclusion of this corollary is a weaker variant of the well-known stronger 
absorption principle CintCb& = Cint = Cb&Cint that holds when Cinr is cumulative and 
Cint is supra-inferential with respect to a consequence operator Cb& satisfying inclusion 
(cf. [ll]). 
2.5. The postulates 
In this section we introduce a minimal set of postulates for rational recovery operators. 
Given a recovery framework ??, = (7, Cb&, db&, Cinr, R) we formulate the following 
postulates the recovery operator R should satisfy: 
(Rl) Success: Cint(R(T)) # L whenever C&T) #L. 
This means that the recovery should be successful: if in the backup semantics, one 
can attach a meaning to T, this postulate requires R(T) to be well-behaved with 
respect to the intended semantics. 
(R2) Conservativity: R(T) = T whenever Cm,(T) # L. 
This postulate guarantees that recovery is done in a conservative way: a recovery 
only leads to a change of T if it is necessary to do so, i.e., if one is unable to assign 
T a meaning under the intended semantics. 
(R3) Minimization: for every R’ satisfying (Rl) and (R2), 
&k(T, R(T)) 6 dbck(7, R’(7)). 
That is, whenever the backup semantics C&k is meaningful, we should try to 
minimize the difference between T and R(T) under Cb&. 
The intention of these postulates is to characterize recovery operations that are 
successful: 
Definition ;!.7. We say that a recovery framework R = (7, Cb,-k, db&, Cjnt, R) iS success- 
ful if, for every T E 7, R(T) satisfies the postulates (Rl)-(R3). If, moreover, it also holds 
that that db&( T, R(T)) = 0, we say that I?, is strongly successful. 
Successfulness does not exclude recovery frameworks that are successful in a trivial 
way, for example, if Cb&T) is not well-behaved for any T E 7 or Ci,l(T) is well-behaved 
for every 1’ E 7. Therefore, we define a nontrivially (strongly) successful recovery 
framework ,as follows: 
Definition 2.8. Let R = (7, Cb&, d&-k, Cint, R) be a (strongly) successful recovery 
framework. We say that R is nontrivially (strongly) successful if there exists at least one 
T E 7 such that Cbek(T) is well-behaved and C&T) is not well-behaved. 
From now on, we will assume that successful recovery frameworks are successful in a 
nontrivial way and we will just omit the adverb “nontrivially”. 
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Remark. As we have seen before, the AGM approach satisfies these postulates, if, for 
example, we take Ci,, = Cn and Cb& the consequence operator that given a theory T 
returns the intersection of Cn( T’) for every maximal consistent subset T’ of T. A recovery 
operator R for a given theory T then returns the set R(T) = nrfEMcscrj Cn(T), where 
Mcs(T) denotes the set of all maximal consistent subsets of T. Clearly, R minimizes 
the distance between T and R(T) under the backup semantics, since dbck(T, R(T)) = 0. 
Hence, this framework is strongly successful. We have, however, to pay a price: the 
consequence operator Cb& does not satisfy inclusion. As we will see, this is typically 
the case whenever the intended semantics satisfies weak cumulativity. 
We first make the following observation about strongly successful frameworks, showing 
that the intended consequences of the recovered theory are bounded below by the backup 
consequences of the original theory. 
Observation 2.9. If R = (7, cb&, dbck, Cint, R) is a strongly SucCeSS’l recovery frame- 
work then Cbck(T) G Cint(R(T>). 
Proof. Since R is strongly successful, by the properties of the distance function dbck, 
we have Cbck( T) = Cb&(R(T)). Since the underlying twin semantics S = (7, Cb&, Ci,t) 
satisfies supra, Cb&R(T)) E C&R(T)). Hence, Cb&(T) 5 Ci,t(R(T)). 0 
Example 2.10. Let us relate the postulates to an example. Consider the following logic 
program 
P: -a t not-b 
at 
Let us take for Cb,-k the minimal model semantics, and for Cint the stable semantics. In 
this case, the conclusion -a of the first rule is attacked by an observation a, without giving 
direct evidence for b to be true. Using the stable semantics, we have to conclude that the 
program is contradictory, since we expect both -a and a to be true. Hence, there is no 
stable model for this program and we conclude that the associated (intended) inference 
operator Cinr applied to the program P is not well-behaved. Still, we could reason as 
follows: if the program P represents all we know, then, from the apparent contradiction 
that both a and -a seem to hold we would derive that it is impossible to assume that b 
is not true. Hence, we are forced to assume that b is true. But combining this information 
with the program P, we conclude that this recovered program has an intuitively acceptable 
stable model in which we expect both a and b to hold. 
It is not difficult to see that such a line of reasoning is sanctioned by using the weaker 
minimal model semantics Cb&: there is exactly one minimal model of P and in this model 
both a and b are true. We use such information in the recovery R(P) of P, since it gives 
us a clue about what abnormalities should be taken into (explicit) account. Summarizing, 
when taking R(P) = P U {b t}, we infer that for this particular P, this approach gives 
rise to a successful recovery. 
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3. Recovery operators and consequence operators 
The recovery postulates (Rl)-(R3) restrict the class of possible recovery operations to 
the ones tha.t are considered to be intuitively acceptable. They do not, however, tell us 
under which conditions a recovery framework is strongly successful or not and, if it is 
strongly successful, which type of recovery operator will be acceptable. 
Therefore, in the subsequent sections we will study the interaction between the 
postulates (Rl)-(R3) and some abstract properties of inference operators in order to find 
out: 
(1) in which cases a recovery framework cannot be strongly successful; 
(2) which type of recovery operators can be excluded if the recovery framework is 
strongly successful; 
(3) in which cases the recovery framework is guaranteed to be strongly successful. 
3.1. Recoveryfor weak cumulative semantics 
In the previous section we remarked that the AGM framework for classical revision 
satisfies the postulates if we use a backup semantics that is not inclusive. We show now that 
whenever the intended semantics is weakly cumulative and R has to be strongly successful, 
the backup semantics cannot satisfy inclusion. 
Theorem 3.J. LA R = (7, cbck, dbck, Cint, R) be a recovery framework, where cbck 
satis$es inclusion and Cint is weakly cumulative. Then R cannot be strongly successful. 
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists a recovery framework R = (7, Cb&, dbck, 
Cintr R) that is nontrivially strongly successful and where Cinr satisfies weak cumulativity. 
By Definition 2.8, there exists a theory T E ‘T such that &k(T) and Ci,t(R(T)) are well- 
behaved, but Gin,(T) is not, i.e., we have Cint(T) = L. 
Since Cirlt satisfies weak cumulativity and Cb,-k satisfies inclusion, by Corollary 2.6 it 
follows that 
Cint((:bck(R(T))) # J!, iff Cint(R(T>) # L. (1) 
By assumption, Cinc(R(T)) # L, hence, it follows that &(Cb&(R(T))) # L. Now, since 
R is strongly successful, db&(T, R(T)) = 0. So &k(T) = Cbck(R(T)) and therefore we 
have 
Cint((:bck(T)) # L. (2) 
Note that Corollary 2.6 can be used for arbitrary recovery frameworks as long as 
Cint and C&k satisfy the conditions. So let US take the recovery framework Rid = 
(7, Cb& , d[,,-k , Cinr, id) , where the recovery operator id is the identity operator on 7. Then 
again by Corollary 2.6, we have Cint(Cbck(id(T))) = Cinr(Cbck(T)) # L iff Ci,t(id(T)) = 
Ci,t(T) # 1,. 
Hence, using (2), it follows that Ci,t(T) # L, contradicting the assumption that 
Ci,t(T) = L. So R cannot be strongly successful; a contradiction. ~1 
150 C. Witteveen, W van der Hoek/Arti$cial Intelligence IO6 (1998) 139-159 
As an immediate consequence this result shows that if the intended semantics is 
(weakly) cumulative, recovery cannot be accomplished without changing the meaning of 
the transformed theory with respect to the backup semantics. This implies among others 
that whenever a paraconsistent logic is used as a backup semantics for a classical semantics, 
theory transformation results in a theory R(T) not equivalent to T under the backup 
semantics. 
More in general, we can easily show in successful recovery frameworks, that R never 
can be an expansion, whenever Cint is weakly cumulative. This follows immediately 
from T z R(T) E Cinr( T) = L, which by weak monotony immediately implies that 
Ci,t(R(T)) = L. 
So we conclude that whenever our intended semantics satisfies weak cumulativity 
it is almost inevitable that information is lost in theory recovery. This is the case 
with such systems as the Closed World Assumption (CWA), system C [9], variants 
of Circumscription and some reconstructions of Default Logic as Brewka’s Cumulative 
Default Logic [2]. 9 It is easy to show that, for example, Pereira’s Contradiction Removal 
Semantics [15] using the classical consequence operator Cn as the backup semantics, 
satisfies the postulates (RI)-(R3) and hence cannot be strongly successful if the intended 
semantics is cumulative. 
Although there are some weakly cumulative nonmonotonic logics, as we remarked 
before, other nonmonotonic logics as default logic, auto-epistemic logic and nonmonotonic 
logic programming do not satisfy weak cumulativity, but satisfy weaker principles such as 
weak cut. So let us now consider the cases where the intended semantics is weaker and 
try to find out which types of recovery operators can or cannot be used that satisfy the 
postulates. 
3.2. Failure for specific recovery operators 
To exclude specific types of recovery operators in successful and strongly successful 
recovery frameworks, in this section we concentrate on two major types of recovery 
operators: expansions and contractions. Given a recovery framework, we call a recovery 
operator R an expansion if for all T E 7 we have T g R(T) and R is called a contraction 
if for all T E T we have R(T) C: T. 
It turns out that the two weak principles making up weak cumulativity nicely 
discriminate between expansions and contractions: 
Theorem 3.2. Let R = (7, Cb&, db&, Cint, R) be a recovery framework, where Cb& 
satisjies inclusion, Cint satisfies weak monotony and R is an expansion. Then R cannot 
be strongly successful. 
Proof. Suppose that R is nontrivially strongly successful, then there is a theory T E 7 
such that Cb&(T) = Cb,-k(R(T)) and Cb&(T) and Cint(R(T)) are well-behaved but 
C&T) is not, i.e., Ci&T) = L. This implies that R(T) # T. Hence, since R is an 
expansion, T C R(T). Therefore, since Cb,-k satisfies inclusion, we have T 5 R(T) c 
9 And of course assuming a backup semantics that satisfies inclusion. 
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Cb&(R(T)). Since R is strongly successful, (R3) and supra imply that T G R(T) G 
Cb&(R(T)) = C&T) g &(T). Using weak monotony, it fOllOWS that &(R(T)) # 
L implies that Ciat(T) # L. By assumption, C&R(T)> # L, hence Ci,,(T) # L; a 
contradiction. q 
On the other hand, if we require Cint to satisfy weak cut instead of weak monotony, 
contraction :IS no longer applicable: 
Theorem 3.3. Let R = (7, C&k, db& Cint, R) be a recovery framework, where C&k 
satisjies inclusion, Cint satisfies weak cut and R is a contraction. Then R cannot be strongly 
successful. 
Proof. Suppose R is nontrivially strongly successful, then there is a theory T E 7 such 
that C&T>1 = Cb&(R(T)) and C&T) and C&R(T)) are well-behaved but C&T) is 
not. This implies that T # R(T). Hence, since R is a contraction, R(T) c T. Therefore, 
since Cb& satisfies inclusion, we have R(T) s T c C&k(T). Since R is strongly 
successful, (R3) and supra imply that R(T) c T G Cbck(T) = Cb,.k(R(T)) G Ci,,(R(T)). 
Using weak cut, Ci&R(T)) # L implies that C&T) # L; contradiction. q 
3.3. Intermediate conclusions 
The results obtained above show that the distinction Makinson [ 1 l] has made between 
two clusters of nonmonotonic entailment relations, one cluster satisfying inclusion and cut 
(the ground’ed cluster) and the other cluster satisfying cumulativity (the minimal model 
cluster), has some major consequences for the type of recovery operation to apply: 
Expansions cannot be applied in the minimal model cluster characterized by 
preferential entailment and Poole’s default logic; 
Contractions are not useful in the grounded cluster containing DL, AEL and NMLP. 
Let us consider the Contradiction Removal framework of Pereira et al. (see [l]) as a 
concrete example of a recovery framework. Using the language of logic programming, the 
main idea b’ehind this approach is that logic programs that do not have acceptable models 
can be revised adequately by removing assumptions. These assumptions are literals of the 
form not-l. Removal of such an assumption not-1 can be accomplished by adding a rule 
1 t to the program and taking the acceptable models of this expanded program as the 
intended models of the original program. It turns out that, taking a classical semantics 
as the backup semantics, the Contradiction Removal Semantics is a special recovery 
framework in which the postulates (Rl)-(R3) are satisfied. This means that (i) it cannot be 
applied successfully if the intended semantics satisfies weak cumulativity and (ii) since the 
Contradiction Removal Semantics aims at adding a minimal set of revisions, the expansion 
approach can be justified by pointing out that contraction never can be an option, as we 
will show in the next section. 
At second look, one observes that the results we have obtained are negative: they do not 
tell us which conditions have to be satisfied in order to guarantee that a revision framework 
would be su.ccessful. 
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Therefore, in the next sections, we will concentrate on successful recovery methods for 
mainstream nonmonotonic logics as DL, AEL and NMLl? We will show that, whenever 
the recovery framework can be applied successfully, but contraction is not possible, we can 
always rely on expansion as a successful recovery method. 
Next, we will investigate which conditions have to be satisfied in order to apply an 
expansion successfully. 
3.4. A framework for minimal change 
In this section we concentrate on useful recovery operators for weak nonmonotonic 
logics as DL, AEL and NMLP. We have shown that for these logics, contraction cannot 
be applied for strongly successful recovery. We will show that in fact we can concentrate 
on expansions. 
First, we show that expansions can be used to represent more general recovery operators 
whenever these are successfully applicable. That is, expansions can be used as indicators 
(whenever contractions are not applicable) to check whether or not there exist successful 
recovery operators. It turns out that we can construct such an expansion in a uniform way. 
Next, we show that whenever one wants to recover a theory T by changing it in a minimal 
way, one has to use expansions. So in case of minimal-change recovery, expansions are the 
only successful recovery operators. 
Our first result shows that expansion frameworks are able to represent all successful 
recovery frameworks, whenever the backup semantics is cumulative and the intended 
semantics satisfies weak cut. 
Theorem 3.4. Let (7, Cb&, Cint) be a twin semantics where Cb& is cumulative and Cint 
satisjies weak cut. Then there exists a strongly successful recovery framework R = (7, 
C&k, db&, Gin,, R) satisfying the postulates (Rl)-(R3) ifSthere exists a strongly successjid 
recovery framework R’ = (I, Cb&, d&k, Gin,, R’), where R’ is an expansion. 
Proof. The if-direction is obvious: take R = R’. To prove the only-if direction, suppose 
that R = (I, Cb&, db&, Cint, R) is a strongly successful recovery framework. Define the 
function R’ as R’(T) = R(T) U T. Note that R’ is an expansion. 
We show that the framework R’ = (7, C&k, db&, Cint, R’) is a strongly successful 
recovery framework. So let T E 7 and assume that Cb&(T) # L. 
l To show that postulate (Rl) is satisfied, it satisfies to show that Ci,,( R’( T)) # L. Since 
Cbck is cumulative, it satisfies inclusion, hence T C Cb& (T) and R(T) s Cb,-k( R (T)) . 
Since R’(T) = R(T) U T, it follows that R’(T) C Cb&(R(T)) U Cbck(T). Moreover, 
SinCe R satisfies (R3),and iS strongly SUCCeSSfUl,Cbck(R(T))= Cbck(T). Hence,we 
have R’(T) G Cb&R(T)). By supra and the definition of R’(T), we have 
R(T) C R’(T) G Cbck(R(T)) C Ci,t(R(T)). (3) 
Remember that R is assumed to be successful, hence C,,( R(T)) # L. Now applying 
weak cut immediately implies that Ci,t(R’(T)) # L. So R’ satisfies (Rl). 
a Postulate (R2) is satisfied, since Cint(T) # L implies that R(T) = T, since R satisfies 
Postulate (R2). Hence R’(T) = T and R’ satisfies (R2), too. 
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l To show that (R3) is satisfied by R’ in a strongly successful way, we show that 
Cb&(T) = Cbck(R’(T)). We have T E R(T) U T. By inclusion and the fact that R 
is stroqgly successful, i.e., Cbck(T) = C&R(T)), it follows that 
7 2 R’(T) = R(T) U T C C&R(T)) U Cbck(T) 
= Cbck(T) u Cbck(T) = Cbck(T). 
NOW &k iS Cumulative, SO We have &&R’(T)) = C&C&k(T)) = C&T), Since 
cumulativity of Cb,-k implies idempotency. 0 
Theorem 3.4 shows that using a weak nonmonotonic logic and a cumulative backup 
semantics, e.xpansions are able to characterize strongly successful recovery frameworks. 
In some cases, however, we are able to prove a much stronger result. Let us define 
a recovery framework a minimal change recovery framework if the recovery operator R 
minimizes the difference between T and R(T) : 
Definition 3.5. Let (7, Cb&, C& be a twin semantics. We call R = (7, C&k, dbck, 
Cinf, R) a strongly successful minimal change recovery framework if for every strongly 
successful necovery framework R’ = (7, C bck, db&, Cint, R’) and every T E 7 it holds 
that R(T) 8 T G R’(T) 8 T. Here X 8 Y = (X - Y) U (Y - X), the symmetric difference 
between X and Y. 
It is not difficult to see that the only recovery operators that can be used in a successful 
minimal change recovery framework are expansions if we use a cumulative backup 
semantics and an intended semantics satisfying weak cut: 
Theorem 3.6. Let R = (7, Cb&, dbck, Cint, R) be a strongly successful minimal change 
recovery framework, where Cb& is cumulative and Cint satis$es weak cut. Then R has to 
be an expansion. 
PrOOf. Let ?? = (7, Cb&, db&, Cint, R) be a strongly successful recovery framework 
where Cb,-k is cumulative and Cint satisfies weak cut. Assume that R is not an expansion. 
By Theorem 3.3 R cannot be a contraction. Hence, there is a theory T E 7 such that 
R(T) = T’ U N where T’ C T, T’ # T, N # 0 and N n T = 0. By (the proof of) 
Theorem 3.4, if we define a recovery operator R’ by R’(T) = R(T) U T, the framework 
%? = (7, Cb&, dbck, Ctnt, R’) is also a successful recovery framework. Since R’(T) = 
R(T)UT=:(T’UN)UT=TUN,wehave 
R’(T) 8 T = N c (T - T’) UN = R(T) 0 T. 
But that implies that R = (7, C&k, db&, Ctnt, R) cannot be a minimal change recovery 
framework; contradiction. Therefore R has to be an expansion. q 
It might be difficult to find a strongly successful expansion framework. If, however, we 
can assume that the backup semantics is cumulative, there is an easy way to tell whether 
or not there is such a framework: 
154 C. Wteveen, W van der Hoek /ArtiJicial Intelligence 106 (1998) 139-159 
Theorem 3.7. Let (7, C&k, Cint) be a twin semantics, where Cb& is cumulative and Cint 
satisjies weak cut. Then there exists a strongly successful expansion framework R = (I, 
C&k, db&, Cint, R) satisfying the postulates (Rl)-(R3) ifs the recovery framework R’ = 
(7, Cbck, db&, Cint, R’) is strongly successful, where R’ is the (full) expansion dejned by 
R’(T) = Cb&(T) t@Cint(T) = L and R’(T) = T else. 
hOOf. (=+) SUppOSe that R = (I, Cb&, db&, Cint, R) is a strongly successful expansion 
framework. We show that ‘I?’ = (7, Cbck, db&, Cint, R’), is strongly sUCCessfU1, too. So 
assume Cbck(T) # L. Since R is an expansion and Cb& satisfies inclusion, we have 
T C R(T) E Cbck(R(T)).Hence,sinceRisstronglysuccessful, T C R(T) = Cb&T).By 
CUmUIatiVityof Cb&, this implies &k(R(T)) = &k(T) = C&C&T)) = Cb&(R’(T)). 
Hence, it is immediate that R’ (strongly) satisfies (R3). By definition, R’ satisfies (R2). 
Finally, we have to show that R’ satisfies (Rl), i.e., that Cint(R’(T)) # L. But that is 
easy, since by inclusion and supra, R(T) C C&k(T) = Cbck( R( T)) 2 Cint (R (T)) . Since 
C,t(R(T)) # L, by weak cut it follows that Cint(Cb&(T)) = Cint(R’(T)) # L. 
(-+) Trivial, since R’(T) by definition is an expansion. q 
4. Recovery of nonmonotonic logic programs 
After a discussion of the general properties of recovery frameworks, we show that our 
recovery framework can be applied successfully to a specific system. We have chosen to 
apply it to nonmonotonic logic programming, in particular the stable model semantics of 
extended logic programs. 
We assume the reader to be acquainted with the basic concepts and notations 
used in logic programming (cf. [7,10]). We consider the class of finite, propositional 
normal logic programs with explicit negation and we will call such programs simply 
logic programs. Such a program consists of a finite set of rules of the form 10 t 
11, . . . , L, not_lm+~, . . , nOt-L+n, m, n > 0, where each li is a literal. Literals of the form 
not-1 are called default negated literals. Given some fixed set of propositional symbols, 
P+ denotes the set of all normal programs with explicit negation. 
As usual, an interpretation of a program P is denoted by the set of literals true in that 
interpretation. An interpretation M is called a model of P if M satisfies every rule of P. 
Given a model M of P, G(P, M) denotes the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduction of P with M. 
Rules(Bp) denotes the set of all possible rules that can be formed by using atoms occurring 
in P. 
We use Mod(P) to denote the set of classical models of P; MinMod( P) denotes the set 
of minimal models and Stable(P) the set of stable models of P. These sets are related by 
Stable(P) s MinMod( P) c Mod(P). 
Given such a semantics Sem E {Mod, MinMod, Stable} and a program P, we define the 
associated inference operation CSem as 
C?“(P) = {$ E Rules(Bp) 1 Sem(P) + 4). 
It is not difficult to show that for every P and every such a semantics Sem, the inference 
operator CSem satisfies weak cut. 
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We will now prove a general result for recovery of logic programs, showing that if 
the stable model semantics is used as the intended model semantics, we can use as our 
backup semantics every cumulative semantics Sem such that Sem( P) # 0 and StubZe( P) c 
Sem( P) s MinMod( P), i.e., every cumulative semantics weaker than the stable semantics 
and consisting of minimal models. lo We will call such a semantics a potential backup 
semantics (with respect to the stable semantics): 
Definition 4.1. Let Sem be a semantics for Pelp. Sem is called apotential backup semantics 
if for every ,P it holds that Stable(P) E Sem( P) E: MinMod( P). 
The following proposition is very helpful in proving properties of a potential backup 
semantics Sem: 
Proposition 4.2. Let Sem be a potential backup semantics for Pet,, and P a program such 
that Sem( P) # 0. Then Sem( P) b @sem(p), where 
Proof. Note that each (finite) model M is just the collection of literals true in M and 
@sern(p) is just the (finite) disjunction of such conjunctions of literals. q 
We will need the following lemma pertaining to properties of stable models: 
Lemma 4.3 (Marek and Trnszczydski [13]). Let M be a model of a program P and let 
MG(P,M) be the least model of the positive program G( P, M). Then MG(P,M) s M. 
The following lemma shows that a potential backup semantics can be used as a backup 
semantics in a strongly successful recovery framework with the stable semantics as the 
intended semantics. 
Lemma 4.4. Let Sem be a cumulative potential backup semantics for Pelt,. Then, for every 
P such that Sem( P) # 0, there is a program P’ containing P, such that C’““(P) = 
Csem( P’) and Stable( P’) # 0. 
Proof. Since Sem(P) # 0, we also have MinMod(P) # 0. Hence, according to Proposi- 
tion 4.2, Sern( P) + @sem(p) # I, where 
@sem(i>) = v AM. 
M&?m(P) 
Let CNF($qem(p)) be the conjunctive normal form of I#Js~~(P). For every disjunction 
8’XlVX2V... v xm occurring in CNF(&em(p)), let Pp” be the program 
Ppm = (xi tnot_xl,. ..,nOt_xi_l,nOt_Xi+1, ._., nOt_Xm 1 i = 1, . . . . m) 
to An exampk of such a semantics is the positivist semantics (see [5]). 
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and, finally, let P sem be the union of all such programs Ppm, 6 being a disjunction 
occurring in CNF(~~sem~p~). We show that P’ = P U Psem satisfies the conditions. 
First of all, we prove the following claims: 
Claim 1. P C P’ 2 Cam(P). 
Proof. The first inclusion is by definition of P’. Since CSem is cumulative it satisfies 
inclusion, hence P C Csem(P). Furthermore, since &m(P) k q5p it follows that 
&m(P) + P Sem. Hen& Psem C CSem (P) . Therefore, - 
P’ = P u pSem s CS”“(P>. 0 
Claim 2. For every M E Sem(P) and every 1 E M, Psem contains at least one rule 1 +- a! 
such that M + 1 and M + (Y. 
Proof. Let M E Sem( P) such that 1 E M. By definition, M b 1. Since Sem(P) E 
MinMod(P), M is a minimal model of CNF(4sem(p)). Consider the set of disjunctions S 
occurring in CNF($p) such that 1 occurs in 6. Since M minimally satisfies CiVF(q&,(p)), 
there is at least one disjunction 61 = 1 V zl V . . . V Zk containing 1, such that M 
minimally satisfies 61, i.e., for i = 1, . . . , k, M p zi. Now Ppm contains the rule 1 t 
not_zl,..., nOt_Zk and M k not-21 A . . . A not_Zk. Hence, there exists at least one rule 
ltcrEPSemsuchthatM~lA/\. 0 
From Claim 1 and the fact that Csem satisfies cumulativity, we immediately derive that 
Csem(P) = Csem(P’), i.e., the semantics Sem is invariant under the transformation from P 
to P’. 
Using Claim 2, it is easy to show that every model M E Sem(P) is also a stable model 
of P’: we only have to prove that M is the minimal model of the Gelfond-Lifschitz 
reduction G(P’, M) of P’ with respect to M. So let M E Sem(P). From Claim 2 above, 
it follows that, for every literal 1 occurring in M, there is at least one rule 1 t q in P’ 
such that M b 1 A cq. Hence, since cq contains only default-negated literal% by definition 
of G( P’, M), for every 1 E M, the rule 1 t occurs in G( P’, M). Therefore, 1 occurs 
in the least model MG(P/,M) of G(P’, M). This implies that MG(PT,M) 2 M. Hence, by 
Lemma 4.3, M = MG(P~,M) and therefore, M E Stuble(P’). q 
Note that, since Since CStahle satisfies cut, it also satisfies weak cut. However, CStnbte(P) 
does not satisfy weak monotony as can be seen from the program P = {la t not-b; 
a t): Although CStabLe(P) = L, we have CStab”(P U {b t)) # L. 
Hence, using the results obtained in the previous sections and the previous lemma, we 
can state the following main results: 
Theorem 4.5. Let R = (P, Csem, dscm, CStable, R) be a recovery framework for elp- 
programs, where Sem is a cumulative potential backup semantics and for every P E P, 
R(P) = P ifStable # 0 and R(P) = P U P Sem else. Then R is a strongly successful 
recovery framework. 
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Proof. First of all, we note that C Sem P) C CStable (P), by definition of the consequence ( _ 
operator for :logic programs and the fact that StubZe( P) S Sem( P). We show that (Rl)- 
(R3) are satisfied whenever CSem( P) is well-behaved: 
(Rl) If c!;“(P) is well-behaved, Sem(P) # 0. By Lemma 4.4 and the definition of R 
it follows immediately that SfubZe(R( P)) = StubZe( P U Psem) # 0 and therefore 
CStal’le( R (P)) is well-behaved. 
(R2) By definition of R. 
(R3) Again by Lemma 4.4. 0 
Theorem 4.6;. Let R = (P, Cb&, db&, C Stab1e, R) be a strongly successful minimal- 
change recovery framework for elp-programs, where Cbck is cumulative. Then R has to 
be an expansion. 
Proof. Immediately from Theorems 4.5 and 3.6. •I 
Remark. Since we do not require the intended semantics to be two-valued, it is also 
possible to revise logic programs with explicit negation using the Well-Founded (WF) 
semantics (see [ 171) as the intended semantics and, for example, the standard three-valued 
Kleene semantics as the backup semantics. A program like 
P: at- 
c t- a, not-b 
-c t- 
does not have an acceptable WF-model: WF(P) = (a, c, -c, -b} is contradictory. Its 
least three-valued model (under the knowledge-ordering of truth-values), however, is 
Ii4 = (a, 1~). So the following program 
P’: a +- 
c + a, not-b 
-lc .+ 
b +- not-b 
has an acceptable well-founded model WF( P’) = {a, -c} identical to M. 
5. Conclusions 
We have presented a framework and some postulates for theory recovery. Our main 
results imply that there is a sharp distinction between recovery of theories satisfying (weak) 
monotony and theories that do not satisfy weak monotony but satisfy (weak) cut: while 
the former cannot be recovered using expansions, the latter cannot be recovered using 
expansions. Furthermore, we have shown that even if we assume almost nothing about the 
properties of the backup semantics, recovery of cumulative theories cannot be achieved 
without some loss of information with respect to the backup semantics. 
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Both classical theory recovery frameworks like the AGM framework as well as existing 
frameworks for nonmonotonic theory recovery like the Contradiction Removal framework 
can be shown to satisfy the postulates we have proposed here. 
With respect to weak nonmonotonic theories like default logic and others, we have 
shown that only mixed recovery operations-in which a part of the theory is retracted and 
at the same time other information is added to it-as well as (pure) expansion operators-in 
which a theory is recovered by adding information to it-are possibly successful recovery 
operators. 
Our results show that, whenever R is a mixed recovery that satisfies the postulates (Rl)- 
(R3), it can always be replaced by a successful expansion that does not produce more 
changes. In particular, we have shown that whenever the backup semantics is cumulative, 
minimal recovery operators for weak nonmonotonic theories have to be expansions in order 
to be successful. 
This result can be related to the approach to theory recovery of Inoue and Sakama (see 
[8]), where they propose to revise a theory T by means of a minimal set of additions Z and 
removals 0 such that R(T) = T + Z - 0 has an acceptable model. Their proposal thus 
comes down to advocating a mixed recovery approach. Our results show that, whenever R 
is a mixed recovery that satisfies the postulates (Rl)-(R3), it can always be replaced by a 
successful expansion that does not produce more changes. 
Finally, in a case study of recovery in nonmonotonic logic programming, we have shown 
that a stable model for a classical consistent program always can be approximated using a 
weaker cumulative (backup) semantics. The evidential semantics presented by Seipel [ 161 
can be seen as a special case of our framework, taking (partial) minimal model semantics 
as the backup semantics and (partial) stable model semantics as the intended semantics. 
An obvious extension of the currently proposed framework would be to use a partially 
ordered set of backup semantics if the intended semantics fails. Then we can think of two 
ways to recover a theory: (i) select the strongest consistent backup semantics from the 
ordered set of backup semantics to construct a recovery framework as we presented here, 
or (ii) apply recovery iteratively, by selecting weaker and weaker backup semantics until a 
consistent one has been found and then use a sequence of recoveries to recover the original 
theory. 
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